The impact of rising oil prices on the transport sector by Rickwood, P
The Impact of Rising Oil Prices on the Transport Sector 
 
Abstract: Oil is the dominant motorized transportation fuel used in most countries, including Australia. Many 
other oil-derived products and services are important to the functioning of the Australian economy. It makes 
sense, then, that this issue of Australian Planner focuses on the risks associated with scarce and/or expensive oil. 
This paper provides background information about oil consumption in Australia, and reviews the available 
information on price elasticities for the major oil end-uses. Based on this review, the impact of higher oil prices is 
assessed, and short and long run policy options are discussed. Reducing fuel used for private motoring, and 
preparing emergency adaptation plans to cope with sudden oil price spikes are identified as the major areas for 
planners to focus on.  
1. Introduction 
This paper has four purposes: to give the reader a clearer understanding of how oil is currently 
used in Australia; to provide details of the historical trends that got us to where we are today; 
to see where those trends would take us under business as usual; and finally, to use this 
information to inform us on how planners may help prepare for dramatically higher oil prices. 
In recognition of the fact that planning practitioners and policy makers operate under practical 
and political constraints, this paper deliberately focuses on those policies that represent small 
to moderate deviations from ‘business as usual’. This paper does not, for example, discuss 
laudable end-goals such as decarbonizing our economy, or drastically reorganizing our cities, 
because planners have limited influence over economic policy, and because less ambitious 
policies such as congestion charging are still contentious and difficult to put in place. Other 
papers in this special edition cover more creative diversions from ‘business as usual’. See, for 
example, the papers by Mees and Stone, and Newman and Wight, in this volume. 
 
2. Oil: not just another energy source 
It is natural at first to think of oil as just one energy source that is interchangeable with the 
many others that make up our total energy consumption. The total energy consumed in the 
form of oil makes up 33.6% of our total primary energy use (ABARE 2009, page 6), and it is easy 
enough to remain optimistic that, in the face of high oil prices, oil could be substituted with 
some other more abundant fuel, such as coal or natural gas. But to look at oil in this way is a 
mistake. A shortage of oil will have important consequences not because there are no other 
energy sources, but because oil use is concentrated in the transport sector, where it is difficult 
to find substitute liquid fuels, or to transition quickly to alternate non-liquid fuel technology. 
This was put succinctly in the influential Hirsch report:  
Oil peaking will create a severe liquid fuels problem for the transportation sector, not an 'energy 
crisis' in the usual sense that the term has been used. (Hirsch et al., 2005, page 5) 
Figure 1 shows that while transport does represent a significant proportion (24%) of total 
Australian energy consumption, it is less important than either electricity generation or 
manufacturing in terms of energy use. 
 Figure 1. Energy use in Australia by sector. Source: ABARE (2009, page 4). 
3. Oil use in Australia 
Oil is responsible for around a third of total primary energy consumption in Australia (ABARE, 
2009), but because of its energy-density and relatively high cost (compared to coal and gas), its 
use is concentrated in areas where other energy sources are not good substitutes. This is 
mostly in transport: 72% of the oil used in Australia is used for transport fuel. Even this slightly 
understates the importance of oil as a liquid fuel for vehicles, as oil consumed in farm and 
mining vehicles is accounted for separately in those sectors. Remaining uses of oil are varied, 
and range from fuel use in agricultural and mining machinery to the making of plastics, 
fertilizers, mechanical oils/lubricants, and bitumen. Figure 2 shows a coarse breakdown of oil 
consumption in Australia, taken from data in ABARE (2009, page 14). After transport (72%), 
mining (8.5%), chemicals/lubricants (7.1%), and agriculture (4.8%) account for most remaining 
oil consumption. 
 
Figure 2. Breakdown of oil consumption in Australia. Data source: ABARE (2009, page 14). 
Because oil is used predominently in transport, it is useful to break transport-related use down  
further. Figure 3 shows a refined breakdown. Road transport (private and commercial) is 
responsible for 76% of transport-related oil consumption, and aviation 17%, with only small 
amounts from rail (2%) and water (5%) transport. 
     
Figure 3. Oil consumption in Australia by transport end-uses. Data source: ABARE (2009, page 
14). 
The large 'road transport' wedge shown in Figure 3 can be broken down into its constituent 
parts, as shown in Figure 4.   
   
Figure 4. Road transport fuel consumption in Australia (2005-6). Reproduced from ABARE 
(2009, page 68).  
What does the preceding information tell us? We can calculate that private car-based personal 
transport is currently responsible for ~35% of all oil consumption in Australia, commercial 
trucking 20%, aviation 13%, and numerous other non-transport sources account for the 
remaining 32%. If oil were to become increasingly expensive, how could each of these sectors 
adjust, and over what time-period is this adjustment possible? I will consider these questions in 
the following section, but will concentrate on the transport sector, as the non-transport uses 
are too varied to be covered in any detail in this article.  
4. Important drivers of oil use in Australia 
Before examining, in Section 5, the ability of different transport sectors to adjust to high oil 
prices, we should understand what factors have combined to produce our current patterns of 
oil consumption, and what our future consumption patterns might look like under 'business as 
usual'. I take business as usual to mean rising real incomes, moderately priced oil (less than $US 
100 barrel, in 2010 dollars), and no great changes in transport infrastructure or policy. This 
section breaks Australia's oil consumption into four end-uses: car-based personal transport; 
commercial trucking; air travel; and other. Focussing on the first three transport end-uses, I will 
examine the important factors that have driven patterns of consumption, and the factors likely 
to be important in the future.  To frame this examination, Table 1 presents historical aggregate 
and per-capita growth in fuel consumption for the three transport end-uses chosen. 
Sector Annual fuel 
consumption growth 
(1987-2007) 
Per-capita fuel 
consumption growth 
(1987-2007) 
Car-based personal transport 0.75% -0.53% 
Commercial trucking 3.54% 2.20% 
Aviation 3.97% 2.65% 
 
Table 1. Compound growth in aggregate and per-capita fuel use in Australia, 1987-2007. 
Source: BITRE (2009, page 153) 
Car-based personal transport (35% of total oil) 
Summary: Plateauing per-capita vehicle-kilometres travelled (VKT) will allow per-capita fuel 
consumption to decline, but population growth will continue to increase total demand for oil. 
Apart from increasing population, there are two other trends that have been responsible for 
steady growth in oil consumption from passenger vehicles: increasing car ownership; and a 
corresponding increase in per-capita VKT (due to increased access to cars and lower occupancy 
ratios, as well as other factors). Partly offsetting this has been a steady increase in vehicle fuel 
efficiency. Figures 5 and 6 show the VKT and car-ownership trends, respectively. These trends 
clearly cant continue forever – car ownership must surely saturate at some level approaching 1 
car per adult, and VKT must plateau given that people have limited time to devote to travel. 
Recent Australian data suggests that per-capita VKT is approaching these upper limits (BITRE, 
2009). A similar plateauing is observable in the US (Office of Highway Policy Information, 2010). 
Car-ownership levels currently show no obvious sign of plateauing, but such a plateau seems 
imminent given that car ownership levels are 0.54 per person (BITRE, 2009) and less than two 
thirds of Australia's population are aged sixteen or older (ABS, 2009a). 
Figure 5. Per-capita VKT in Australia. Source: Author's calculations based on BITRE (2009, page 
74), and ABS (2009b)  
Figure 6. Per capita car ownership in Australia. Source: author's calculations from BITRE (2009, 
page 73), and ABS (2009b). 
On the aggregate figures, it thus appears that while increasing car ownership and VKT have  
historically been significant drivers of oil use in Australia, they are likely to play a lesser role in 
the future. More important than changes to per-capita car ownership and VKT levels will be 
changes in total population.  
While aggregate statistics on per-capita VKT suggest that personal travel is plateauing, it is 
important to note that there are a number of underlying factors that are responsible for this 
plateauing besides the natural limits already mentioned (i.e. saturating ownership and travel-
time constraints). For example, there has been less fringe expansion and more urban 
consolidation in Australian cities in the last three decades (see Randolph (2006)), and this 
would have played a part in curbing VKT-growth, as we know that the distance driven by outer-
suburban households is an order or magnitude more than the distance driven by inner-
suburban households (see Figure 7). Even after adjusting for household structure and income, 
equivalent outer-suburban households travel around two to three times the distance of their 
inner-suburban equivalents (Perkins 2002; Rickwood 2009). There are two interrelated reasons 
for this: public transport service is generally very poor, and activities are more spread out, 
making trips longer. There are between-city differences also, with Sydney having lower car-use 
than other Australian capitals even after controlling for other factors (see Rickwood and 
Glazebrook (2009)).  
 
Fig 7: Daily vehicle kilometres per household by travel zone in Sydney. Source: author's 
calculations using VKT model adapted from data described in Corpuz et al. (2006). 
Looking forward, all factors point to plateauing per-capita VKT even with stable petrol prices. 
There is even the possibility of a decline in per-capita VKT, given that congestion caused by a 
growing population may encourage some shift to public transport. The strength of this shift 
would of course be heavily influenced by the quality of public transport infrastructure and 
service provided, and the appropriateness of accompanying land-use planning. With plateauing 
per-capita VKT and modest improvements in fleet efficiency, fuel demand is likely to be 
increase at somewhat less than the population growth rate, most recently forecast to be 1.2% 
out to 2049 (Australian Treasury 2010). Given flat per-capita VKT and increasing fuel efficiency, 
we might reasonably expect total private passenger fuel consumption under 'business as usual' 
to increase at a rate below 1% per annum.  
Commercial trucking (20% of total oil) 
Summary: Fuel use largely driven by economic growth. 
The quantity of fuel used for commercial trucking has grown more-or-less in-line with GDP over 
the last 20 years. The relationship is a little more complicated than this, because the volume of 
goods (i.e. tonne-kilometres) trucked has grown faster than GDP at 4.4% per annum (BITRE, 
2009), but this has been offset by other factors such as improved fuel efficiency. The growth in 
tonne-kilometres has been driven by changes in patterns of inter-regional trade (which has 
increased over the past four decades), by changing goods-transport requirements (i.e. 
increased overnight trucking), and by logistics and warehousing (e.g. low-inventory 'just-in-
time' warehousing and distribution). It seems likely that under 'business as usual', trucking fuel 
consumption will be driven largely by economic growth.  
Aviation (13% of total oil) 
Summary: Rapid growth expected to continue under 'business as usual', where incomes 
continue to rise and fuel costs do not increase substantially. Downside risks posed by poor 
economic conditions and/or significant increases in fuel costs are substantial.  
The aviation sector has had the fastest growth in fuel consumption over the last 20 years, with 
fuel consumption growing at a faster rate than GDP. Fuel consumption grew at a compound 
annual rate of 3.97% between 1987-2007, but this understates the growth in air travel, because 
fuel efficiency has increased dramatically over the same period. The number of seat-kilometres 
flown has grown by 7.3% per year over the same period (BITRE 2009, page 93). Growth in air 
travel has been driven by both rising incomes and declining flight costs.  Leisure air travel is a 
luxury good, and so demand grows faster than incomes as incomes rise. Thus, even if air-fares 
had remained constant over the last 20 years, we would have expected a significant increase in 
air travel. But in fact, air fares have fallen dramatically in real terms. Since 1993, for example, 
air-fares have fallen by 32% (BITRE 2009). The combination of declining real costs and 
increasing incomes has caused the air-transport sector to be the fastest growing transportation 
sector. If incomes continue to rise, and fuel prices remain near current levels in real terms, 
aviation is likely to see continued rapid growth. The aviation industry is, however, very sensitive 
to economic conditions, and the long-term outlook would be greatly altered by poor economic 
conditions and/or increasing fuel costs. These issues are explored further in Section 6. 
Other (32% of total oil) 
Mining (8.5%), chemicals & lubricants (7.1%), water transport (5%), agriculture (4.8%), rail (2%), 
bus (1%), other (3.6%). 
Summary: Continued growth in mining and water transport, driven by mining industry growth 
and international trade. Outlook for other sectors less clear. 
The end-uses making up the remaining 32% of oil consumption are too varied to cover in any 
detail in this article. Mining oil consumption (8.5%) will be driven by growth (or otherwise) in 
the mining industry. Water transport (5%) will be driven by growth in long-distance bulky goods 
transport (i.e. inter-national trade). The number of factors influencing oil use in the other 
sectors means that the outlook for those sectors is less clear. 
5. Oil and climate change 
Because climate change mitigation is receiving a lot of attention, it is common for oil 
consumption to be viewed through this lens. Given that transport makes up most oil 
consumption, and transport is an issue of particular interest and relevance to planners, it is 
natural enough for planning researchers and policy-makers to consider the greenhouse 
emissions attributable to transport. Transport-related energy consumption and related 
greenhouse emissions are significant, making up 14.7% of Australia's total greenhouse 
emissions in 2009 (DCCEE 2010, page 3). This is lower than transport's share of total energy use 
(24%) because oil is a less intensive greenhouse fuel than the other major fuels: coal and gas. 
Most urban transport energy is consumed in private passenger vehicles, and this is also the 
area that planners can have the most influence. The urban planning research on this matter is 
clear – fringe development results in high car ownership and use (Bento et al 2003; Ewing 2002; 
Rickwood et al. 2008), and development near well-connected employment and transport nodes 
results in lower car ownership and use1 (Rickwood and Glazebrook 2009). These findings are 
broadly acknowledged by policy-makers, with the importance of centres and corridors 
acknowledged in most major metropolitan planning documents. It remains to be seen how well 
(or whether) these plans are implemented.  
The most important influence that climate change will have on the transport sector is that it 
will make a straightforward transition to coal and gas derived energy more difficult. If CO2 
emissions were not an issue, it would be possible, over the long term, to reduce oil 
consumption by synthesising liquid fuels from coal or gas, or by moving to electric vehicles. 
Either of these options, however, would result in a significant increase in greenhouse emissions 
unless they were accompanied by other measures such as carbon sequestration or renewable 
electricity generation. In the following section, where I evaluate the ability of the transport 
sector to adapt to expensive oil, I will exclude adaptive options that have adverse consequences 
for CO2, as they will be untenable given any serious efforts to curb CO2 emissions. I will also not 
consider options that require the use of technologies that may be possible, but are not yet 
feasible or economic. 
6. The Transport Sector's ability to adapt to expensive oil 
 
Note: In this section, I will use estimates of price elasticity to assess the transport sector's likely 
response to increased oil prices. For the purposes of this paper it is not possible to either provide 
background information about this approach, or discuss possible alternate approaches. For a 
good general summary see Krugman & Wells (2006, Chapter 5).  
  
To understand how different transport modes might adjust to high oil prices, it is necessary to 
understand three things: how sensitive demand for those modes is (i.e. the price-elasticity of 
                                               
1 I stress the 'well connected' because it is clear that access to a nearby centre alone is not a good indicator of 
general access to urban services. Access to a highly connected centre, however, is a good indicator (Rickwood 
and Glazebrook, 2009). 
demand); whether alternate fuels are available (fuel substitutes); and whether demand for 
travel by that mode may be substituted by some other mode of transport or some other 
technology (mode substitutes). Table 2 summarises information available on these three 
factors for different transport nodes. From this information, one can map out a conventional 
economic view of how oil price increases will affect the transport sector: the short-term 
response to a rise in oil prices is a large reduction in demand for leisure air travel, and a less 
marked reduction in business air-travel. Sustained high oil prices would see these demand 
reductions sustained over the longer term, and possibly strengthened slightly due to longer-
term responses by businesses to substitute air-travel with videoconferencing or other 
collaborative technology. For private passenger vehicles (the largest single use), the short-term 
response is likely to be a modest decline in vehicle use. Longer term, this reduction in vehicle 
use will be accompanied by increased vehicle efficiency.  
 
elasticity (short-
run)  
  elasticity 
(long-run)  
Fuel 
substitutes  
Other 
substitutes  
Likely response to 
high oil prices  
Business air 
travel  
-1.1 (Nairn and 
Hooper, 1992, 
p55)  
Unclear. Likely 
somewhat 
(but not 
greatly) higher 
than  short-
run.  
None  
Video-
conferencing  
Demand reduction.  
Longer-term -- 
reorganization of 
business processes 
for more video-
conferencing.  
Leisure air 
travel  
-3.2 (Lubulwa, 
1986, p208) 
-2.3 (Nairn and 
Hooper, 1992, 
p55)  
Unclear. Likely 
similar to 
short run  
None  Domestic holidays  Demand reduction.  
Private 
passenger 
vehicles  
-0.25 (Goodwin et 
al., 2004) 
-0.25 (Graham 
and Glaister, 
2004)  
-0.15 (Gargett 
and Hossain, 
2008) 
-0.64 
(Goodwin et 
al., 2004) 
-0.77 (Graham 
and Glaister, 
2004)  
-0.4 (Gargett 
and Hossain, 
2008) 
Other liquid 
fuels 
Electricity 
Hydrogen  
Public transport  
Mixed. Short term 
some demand 
reduction, some 
mode switch. 
 
Longer term unclear 
except for lower 
vehicle fuel 
consumption.  
Commercial 
trucking  
Depends on good 
being trucked. 
 
-7.42 to 1.72 
(Graham and 
Glaister, 2004) – 
international 
 
mean -1.07, std. 
dev. 0.84)  
Unclear, but 
higher than 
short-run.  
Other liquid 
fuels  
Rail freight 
(imperfect)  
Reduced demand 
for a few goods (i.e. 
price-elastic low 
value, bulky goods) 
 
Some transfer to rail 
and sea where 
possible (i.e. non-
perishables).  
 
Table 2. Price elasticity and substitution information for major transport end-uses. 
To make the data in Table 2 a little more concrete, let us see what would happen if fuel prices 
were to increase by two thirds and be sustained at this level (in real terms) for several years. At 
this level, the elasticities in Table 2 suggest that leisure air travel in and from Australia would 
decline by around 50%2, and business air travel would decline by perhaps a quarter3. Using the 
elasticities reported in Goodwin et al. (2004), we would expect private vehicle fuel use to 
decline in the short term by a quarter – about  half of which takes place through reductions in 
discretionary travel, and the other half through other measures such as driving more fuel 
efficient vehicles (i.e. multi-car families prioritizing use of the more fuel efficient vehicle). In the 
longer term (3-5 years), we would expect around a 64% reduction in automotive fuel use 
(Goodwin et al., 2004), being made up of ~ 30% reduction in actual travel and a 50% 
improvement in vehicle fleet efficiency (whether through technology or other means such as 
car pooling). If a 50% improvement in fleet efficiency in 3-5 years strikes you as unrealistic, you 
are not alone, and this highlights the difficulty of relying on the standard elasticity data 
reported in the transport economics literature. We cannot reasonably extrapolate the 
information in the transport economics literature to a future with $US 150-200/barrel oil 
because price elasticity changes with price, and we have very little recent information about 
price elasticities above $US 75 per barrel. The situation is even worse for long-run elasticities, 
because the real price of oil (in 2008 dollars) has been above $US 60/barrel for a sustained 
period only once before – from 1979 to 1983. In short, we are entering uncharted territories, 
and the existing information we have on price (and income) elasticities are at best a useful 
rough indicator.  
Although the information shown in Table 2 will not give an accurate quantitative guide to how 
the different transport sectors would adjust to high oil prices, using the information within it 
we can, with some confidence, make the following predictions: 
Car-based personal transport: There is some limited capacity to reduce demand by eliminating 
discretionary travel, but this is easily overestimated. Per-capita VKT was 35-40% lower in the 
1970's (BITRE 2009), and given that this increase has been driven partly by society wide 
changes that cannot be easily undone (such as the move to double-income families), it may 
seem unrealistic to consider a return to that level of car-use possible. However, given that 
existing observed variations in city spatial structure and public transport networks have a large 
(~20-25%) independent effect on per-capita VKT (Bento et al. 2003; Ewing et al. 2002; Glaeser 
and Kahn 2008), it is not unreasonable to think that, over the long-term at least, changes in 
spatial structure coupled with complementary changes to transport infrastructure, networks, 
and planning could achieve substantial savings. In an Australian context, detailed modelling of 
land-use planning scenarios has indicated that residential land-use planning policies alone can 
result in a 10% reduction in per-capita private VKT over the long term, even assuming 
continued reliance on private motor vehicles for mobility, with limited investment in public 
transport (Rickwood 2009). Public transport is a potential substitute for car travel, but currently 
it is, for most Australians, a poor one. This need not remain the case. A renewed focus on public 
transport infrastructure provision and (perhaps more importantly) network planning would 
make public transport a better substitute for car travel.  
Improved vehicle efficiency could also dramatically reduce oil consumption, with fleet-wide 
reductions in fuel use approaching 50% achievable with currently available vehicle technology. 
However, the length of time required to replace the vehicle fleet (~ 20 years) means that it is 
                                               
2 This is calculated based on an elasticity of -2.75 (the mean of the two values given in Table 2), a 66% increase in 
fuel price, and assumed fuel costs comprising 25% of total fare costs. 
3 Same assumptions as for leisure travel, but with an elasticity of -1.1, as reported in Nairn and Hooper (1992). 
important that we start making changes to our fleet immediately. Plug-in electric vehicles could 
also play a role provided that the electricity required came from renewable. 
To cope with higher oil prices, some moderate reduction in car travel (at least 10%) could be 
achieved through demand reduction alone with limited impact on economic and/or social well-
being. As explained above, a further 20-30% reduction in fuel use could be achieved through 
better land-use and transport planning that would both reduce the need for some travel, and 
allow other travel to take place on public transport. Combined with the fleet efficiency 
improvements of up to 50% already mentioned, these measures would result in per-capita 
private vehicle fuel use decreasing by two-thirds. See Glazebrook and Rickwood (2008) for a 
more detailed discussion. 
Commercial trucking: At first glance, it might seem that an increase in fuel costs would pose a 
serious problem for non-bulky goods transport, because there are no fuel substitutes, there is 
no scope for transitioning to electric or hybrid vehicles, and because rail cannot currently 
compete for goods that require timely delivery. However, fuel costs are only a few percent of 
final goods costs (Gargett and Hossain 2008, page 3), so even a very large increase in fuel costs 
would result in relatively small flow-on costs to delivered goods. For goods that require fast 
end-to-end delivery there is no clear substitute to trucking, and extra fuel costs will simply be 
passed on with little change in trucking volumes and only small flow-on cost pressures on 
delivered goods. Thus, while there is little scope for adaptation to high fuel prices, there is little 
need to adapt, as costs can be passed on to freight customers and from there to consumers. As 
a consequence, tonne-kilometres and consequent fuel use could continue to grow even in the 
face of increases in fuel costs. One substitution possibility not covered here (but discussed in 
detail in Glazebrook (2009)) is transporting trucks via rail (i.e. on flatbed rail carriages), with the 
trucks driving on/off at rail end-points. This could save a significant quantity of fuel, but would 
require better freight rail management & logistics, because to short-haul commercial trucking 
often requires fast delivery. 
Aviation: The aviation sector has very limited adaptive potential, as there are no clear non-oil 
based substitutes for jet-fuel, and demand is sensitive to price. There is also limited potential 
for demand to be substituted through video-collaboration, virtual meetings, or other 
technologies. Thus, both airlines and airline customers will be greatly affected by an increase in 
oil prices, over both short and long terms.  
7 Summary & policy implications 
From the preceding analysis, we can see that oil use is concentrated in the transport sector, and 
there are no short term substitutes for oil-derived liquid fuels that can be widely adopted. 
These observations mean that besides large reductions in transport demand, there are few 
obvious short-term adaptive options for the transport sector. Things are better, but not by 
much, over the longer term. Over the longer term, there could be some partial transitioning to 
alternate fuels (i.e. coal to liquid-fuel, biofuels), but there are significant environmental or 
economic issues associated with large-scale substitution of petroleum-derived fuel with 
alternate fuels, so fuel-switching cannot be a long term solution by itself.  
Recommendation: Oil will not be replaced by other liquid fuels. Reducing oil consumption will 
require measures other than simple fuel-switching, and planners need to prepare for this. 
Before attempting to distil further policy implications for planners from the material presented 
earlier, it is worthwhile taking a step back to consider how one should frame the the liquid fuels 
'problem' caused by peak oil. The simplest approach one can take is to estimate what is likely to 
happen, and then put in place a planning strategy to copy with the envisaged future. This 
approach is common in many planning documents, and has the benefit of being simple and 
comprehensible. These are valuable attributes, but such an approach is not well suited to 
situations where the future is uncertain, and where unlikely events have very high associated 
costs. For example, most will concede that there is great uncertainly about the future price of 
oil, and of the way in which the transport sector in particular, and economy more generally, 
would respond to higher oil prices. But uncertainty makes the case for preparatory action 
stronger because the economic and social costs of high oil prices are not linear: most people 
and most businesses can dispense with some discretionary travel with little loss and make 
other adjustments with minor inconvenience, but when petrol rises beyond a certain price it 
begins to disrupt important social and business travel – interfering with the economic and 
social functioning of our settlements. When viewed this way, the case for early action is much 
stronger, because the costs of particular measures are not balanced merely against the likely 
benefits of those measures, but also the unlikely benefits – the 'adaptive insurance' that those 
measures provide against unlikely, but costly, futures.   
Recommendation: Planners should adopt a risk-management approach to planning for peak oil. 
This is not a recommendation to undertake mitigatory or adaptive policy responses at any cost. 
Rather, it is a recommendation that the costs incurred in preparing for high oil prices (through, 
for example, investment in public transport) be balanced against the future risk-weighted costs 
of dealing with high oil prices. 
Taking this recommendation on board, what then does the material presented in Sections 1 
through 6 tell us? Primarily, it tells us that aviation has very little adaptive potential, and that 
unless we dramatically increase rail’s share of short-haul commercial freight, large reductions in 
oil use are unlikely to come from commercial trucking. Price pressures will force private 
motorists to reduce their fuel usage first. Luckily, this is an area where there are viable 
strategies to reduce oil use. It is also an area that planners have direct influence over. 
Recommendation: Compared to the other transport sectors, fuel consumed by private vehicles 
is more easily reduced. It is this area that planners should focus on. 
And how might planners go about this? There are three paths, all of which can be followed 
simultaneously. Firstly, a halving of fuel use is achievable simply by switching to smaller, more 
fuel efficient passenger vehicles. However, based on recent scrappage rates (ABS 2007), it 
would take around two decades to replace the existing vehicle fleet. This could be accelerated 
somewhat with 'cash-for-clunkers' style programs, but would still take many years. Since 
transitioning to a more efficient passenger fleet has few downsides, and many advantages quite 
apart from reducing oil dependence, this transition should be pursued with vigour now. If the 
standard policy approaches to achieving this transition (i.e. fuel efficiency standards, fuel taxes, 
fuel-economy based registration costs) are unavailable, planners can resort to less ideal 
measures more directly within their control, such as parking controls or differentiated parking 
charges based on vehicle type. Secondly, planners should prepare for the possibility that public 
transport will need to provide a viable substitute for many trips currently taken by car, rather 
than a means of providing peak-capacity to get people to and from work. This requires 
comprehensive transport networks covering our cities, rather than the predominantly radial 
systems we currently have (Mees, 2009). Thirdly, and finally, land-use and transport planning 
can, over the long term, both reduce the need for motorized travel and increase mode shift to 
public transport. 
Recommendation: Vehicle efficiency, improved public transport networks, and integrated land-
use/transport planning can all be pursued together, and together can achieve substantial 
reductions in oil use. Combined, these actions could result in per-capita savings approaching 
two thirds of current private-vehicle consumption (see Section 6). 
The responses discussed above are all long-term strategies. Since the vehicle fleet cannot be 
changed in the short term, and large-scale expansion of public transport networks (even using 
only buses) would still take years, there is a need for planners to prepare separate short-term 
plans to deal with sudden spikes in oil price. If oil were to hit $US 250 per barrel (for whatever 
reason), it would cause great disruption to large number of Australians who rely on the car for 
travel. It is therefore important that emergency transport plans be ready that could be put in 
place quickly to ameliorate the impact. These plans could be as simple as identifying 
'emergency' bus lanes and planning to run emergency bus services to areas identified as being 
most sensitive to petrol price increases. There has already been some analysis of oil-
vulnerability in Australia which planners can draw on (Dodson and Sipe 2008).  
Recommendation: Planners should identify households and businesses most vulnerable to oil 
price shocks, and prepare quickly implementable emergency adaptation plans to ameliorate the 
impact on these households and businesses.   
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